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The antiafflrmative action movement has arrived in California.
The proposed California Civil Rights Initiative would mandate that
the "state not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to,
any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or
national origin in the operation of public employment, public educa-
tion, or public contracting."' The Initiative was intended by its draft-
ers to combat the "unfairness" caused by "government-
forced.., preferences based upon race and gender,"2 and to foster an
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. The author wishes
to thank Lawrence Solum and David Leonard.
1. Bill Jones, Secretary of State, Proposition 209, in CALEFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET,
GENERAL ELECnON, Nov. 5, 1996 (forthcoming Sept. 1996) [hereinafter Initiative].
2. Open letter from Pete Wilson, Governor of the State of California available at
http://www.publicaffairsweb.com/ccri/wilson/htm [hereinafter Wilson Letter]. See also
Cathleen Decker, Woman Named to Anti-Affirmative Action Campaign, L.A. TimEs, Dec.
21, 1995, at A3 ("[The Initiative's] supporters argue that it would restore fairness to gov-
ernment operations and would curb affirmative action programs that discriminate against
non-favored groups."). Cost is also an important sub-issue within the "fairness" issue. See
Wilson Letter ("[Because of race and gender preferences] the taxpayers of [one city] paid
an extra $650,000 for a city contract to a 'minority' contracting firm, even though another
non-minority firm had bid $650,000 less TO DO THE SAME JOB!").
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"equal opportunity"3 and "color-blind society," as opposed to one
that is "blind[ly]" race-conscious.4 The Initiative is the most current
example of the antiaffirmative action movement. Underlying the
struggle against affirmative action programs is the premise that such
programs "sin[fuly]"5 take advantage of "innocent ' 6 whites, who are
entitled to equal opportunity access to jobs and education, limited
only by a neutral value system which measures them based on objec-
tive standards of "merit."'7 The relationship of merit to the Initiative
is, even at first glance, a multi-dimensional concept. Since the Initia-
tive covers decisionmaking regarding candidates for public education,
public employment, and public contracting, the Initiative's backers
foresee deploying a foundational color-blind, and gender-blind "mer-
itocracy" in such disparate areas as education, construction, and
administration.
However, there is an additional complexity to the notion of merit
which even this observation does not reflect. Underlying the justifica-
tion for the Initiative-that "each person deserves to be judged on his
3. See Bob Dole, A California Renewal of Civil Rights' Goal, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19,
1995, at M5 ("Promoting equal opportunity does not mean guaranteeing equal re-
sults.. .. 'The objective of a generation of civil rights fighters of all races and colors had
been to give every American an equal chance at the starting line-but not a guaranteed
outcome at the finish line .. ") (citation omitted).
4. See id. ("If we truly want to build a color-blind society, then the federal govern-
ment ought to lay the foundation by adopting policies that are consistent with this
goal.... [T]he real dividers are the purveyors of preferences themselves, who view every
social problem through a racial prism. If we are to break the cycle of racial distrust that
now grips America, we must remove the group-think blinders and begin to view one an-
other not as blacks or whites, Asians or Latinos, but as fellow citizens: as Americans.").
5. Kathleen Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases,
100 HARV. L. REv. 78, 91 (1986) ("[The Supreme Court has] cast[ ] affirmative action as
penance for particular sins of discrimination ...."); see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA 106 (1990) ("It makes little sense, or justice, to sacrifice a white or
a male who did not inflict discrimination to advance the interests of a black or a female
who did not suffer discrimination. No old injustice is undone, but a new injustice is
inflicted.").
6. Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REv. 297,299 (1990)
("A persistent and apparently important part of the affirmative action dialogue, both judi-
cial and academic, is what can be termed the 'rhetoric of innocence.'The rhetoric of inno-
cence is used most powerfully by those who seek to deny or severely limit affirmative
action . . ").
7. Cynthia H. Craf et al., Political Briefing: Senator Assails Santa Cruz Chancellor
Over Angela Davis Honor, L.A. Timas, July 21, 1995, at B5. ("'So-called affirmative ac-
tion is morally wrong.... It merely continues in a different guise the same race-based
discrimination that was wrong in the first place. First-class people come in all colors, and
it's our job to find them based on merit."' (quoting San Fernando Valley congressional
candidate Rich Sybert)). See also Wilson Letter, supra note 2 ("Each person deserves to be
judged on his or her merits.").
or her own merits" 8 -exists a monolithic, if inchoate, conception of
what merit is, of what it means to be the "best." The premise of this
Essay is that our current conception of merit-that it is color-blind
and gender-blind, numerical, quantifiable, neutral, and transparently
fair-has been formed in exclusion. That is, the meaning of merit has
been constructed without reference to the virtues and values of people
of color, women, and sexual minorities-typical "Outsiders"-who
have demonstrated excellence even under conditions of subordina-
tion. Some of these forms of merit have deep roots in gender, race,
color, class, ethnicity, and sexual orientation. They can be seen in
some Outsiders' empathy for disadvantaged people, their developed
skills for interpreting and overcoming subordination, and their unflag-
ging praxis in the face of seeming intractability. They are, in fact,
"gendered" and "raced" responses to gender and race discrimination,
and they would sadly remain unnoticed under the "blind" approach
advocated by the Initiative's backers.
This Essay skeptically responds to the banner of color blindness
raised by the Initiative's backers because the color-blind ideal itself
seems scrutably "gendered" and "raced" when viewed from a perspec-
tive which recognizes Outsider merit. Any system which so consist-
ently leaves out these ideas in its definition of "the good" seems to be
responding only to an "insider" ideology. In addition, ignoring
"gendered" and "raced" forms of merit risks marginalizing some of
the richest roads to repair-the insights, empathy, and skills of Out-
siders-which are invaluable resources for a state which continually
announces its commitment to racial and gender equality. Affirmative
action dissolves these risks by increasing the representation of Outsid-
ers in the higher echelons of education and employment, and thus has
the potential for what I call "merit-teaching,"-the expansion of our
current definition of merit to include the contributions of previously
silenced voices.
I will first analyze the notion of merit from the perspective of
critical race and feminist legal theorists.9 These theorists have already
paved the road to critiquing the illusory nature of a blind "mer-
itocracy" and have gone far to support their claim that neutral merit
standards were designed to promote the interests of a white male
"mythic norm."'10 Second, in order to further explore the unspoken
8. See Wilson Letter, supra note 2.
9. See infra notes 17-26 and accompanying text.
10. This is a term coined by Audre Lorde. See Audre Lorde, Age, Race, Class, and
Sex: Women Redefining Difference, in SISTER OUTSIDER 114, 116 (1984).
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gender and race investments of a supposedly neutral merit system, I
will discuss Aristotelian moral theory-which identifies seemingly
universal and neutral virtues-and the philosophical debate over
whether there are distinct virtues of the oppressed. I will utilize ob-
servations made by Aristotelian moral philosophers as a stepping-off
point for my argument that Outsider merit does exist and would be
ignored in a blind system. Finally, I will use the storytelling methodol-
ogy of critical race and feminist legal theorists in order to identify the
individual "gendered" and "raced" forms of merit that have been
demonstrated by members of my own family-three generations of
Mexican-American women who have navigated the boundaries of
gender, class, race, and ethnicity in this country since the 1950's.
I. The Feminist and Critical Race Critique of Standards
Suppose we have candidate A and candidate B, each applying for
a position in a public law school. "Merit," as it is configured for law
school admissions, could be seen as measured by the applicants' re-
spective performances on the Law School Admission Test (LSAT),
their grades, writing skills, and other, less quantifiable criteria.1 Can-
didate A, who is a white male, has substantially higher grades and
LSAT scores than does Candidate B, a Latina. 2 Candidate A's per-
sonal statement and work history reveal that he has some experience
in telemarketing and accounting and has been a volunteer coach for a
little-league softball team in his neighborhood. Candidate B, how-
ever, demonstrates a high regard for and connection to her ethnic
community in her personal statement and work history as a volunteer
in a battered women's shelter. Her personal statement also reveals
her intimate understanding of discrimination along both race and gen-
der lines.
Between these two, who should be picked? Using "neutral" stan-
dards (that is, "race-less" and "gender-less" valuations of merit), Can-
didate A is the clear winner. Under color-blind ideals of
11. See, e.g., LOYOLA LAW ScHoOL Los ANGELES, BULLETIN AND APPLICATION 27
(1996) (The section on "Admissions Information" states that the school seeks candidates
who have undertaken an undergraduate "curriculum of breadth and depth, [and have]
grades demonstrating excellence in intellectually challenging course material ... [as well as
strong] writing skills . . . . [Further qualifications include] a high degree of
professionalism.").
12. The comparison between Candidate A's and Candidate B's numerical scores is
based on the Bakke case, where minorities admitted under the separate admissions process
had numerical scores which were "significantly lower" than Bakke's. See Regents of Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 277 (1978).
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"meritocracy," race, gender, and ethnicity are somehow divorced from
neutral qualifications, leaving the "deracinated" candidate to be eval-
uated on a now equal playing field.' 3 Viewed without regard to gen-
der and ethnicity, both candidates are generous and philanthropic
(having both served as volunteers), and one has better number
qualifications.
Feminist legal theorists and critical race scholars, however, object
to the assumption that the current incarnations of merit standards are
neutral and color-blind. "[N]eutral, impersonal and objective crite-
ria,"'14 as they are currently being deployed, are viewed not as univer-
sal norms, but as "one-sided,"'" "structured preferences"' 6 which
favor the included and overlook, or even negate, the perspectives and
potential contributions of white women and people of color. These
"norms" contain a particular, privileged, exclusive referent which only
appears "transparent."' 7
13. See RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 366-67 (1981) (objecting to
the use of "racial or ethnic criteria... [in] determin[ing] the distribution of government
benefits and burdens" although qualifying this principle to accommodate segregation in
prison race-riots); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,273-74 (1986) ("Any pref-
erence based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most searching examina-
tion.") (emphasis added); Derrick Bell, The Final Report, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2382, 2403-04
(1989) ("'Answer me this, Derrick, have you ever heard of merit? That means achieving
something by yourself without having it handed to you for doing nothing. Harvard should
recruit the brightest and most promising students in the nation based on past record, not
granting positions based on race."') (quoting from an antiaffirmative action letter he
received).
14. Gary Peller, Race-Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 777 (1990).
15. See id. at 772 ("Neutrality is universality according to the integrationist ethic but
[critical race theorists] understand neutrality to contain within it an invisible form of race
prejudice. And we also consider 'universality' to be a one-sided concept, an exclusionary
one which vests itself in privilege by purporting to speak for everyone.").
16. See PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 103 (1991) ("Stan-
dards are nothing more than structured preferences .... [T]he whole historical object of
equal opportunity is to structure preferences for rather than against the participation of
black people.").
17. See Barbara Flagg, I Was Blind, But Now I See: White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953, 957 (1993) (Flagg identifies a
"transparency phenomenon," which is the "tendency of whites not to think about white-
ness, or about norms, behaviors, experiences, or perspectives that are white-specific."); see
also Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment Transformation and Legitima-
tion in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1379-80 (1988) ("[T]he white
norm... [is] a statement of the positive social norm, legitimating the continuing domina-
tion of those who do not meet it."); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-
Forward: Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REV. 10, 32, 68 (1987) ("The unstated point of
comparison is not neutral, not particular, and not inevitable, but only seemingly so when
left unstated.... [Plower is at its peak when it is least visible, when it shapes preferences,
arranges agendas, and excludes serious challenges from discussion or even imagination.");
Alex Johnson, The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L. J. 2007,2030 (1991) (examining "inte-
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Feminists and critical race theorists challenge the foundation
upon which these "neutral" concepts of merit rest. They ask: "How
were these standards developed?" "How can a system be truly neu-
tral and noncontextual in the first place?"' "How could it be univer-
sal if it was forged from exclusion?" In other words, can the
majority's concept of neutral fairness be fair if those who framed the
original concept of merit did so in the absence of white women and
people of color?19 Indeed, they may have developed their definitions
by using "others" as the signpost for what it means to be devoid of
merit.2 ° Inherent in this critique of merit is a challenge to the "blind-
ness" principle-the theory upon which antiaffirmative action advo-
cates depend. Again, instead of promoting neutrality and fairness, a
gender, race, and ethnicity blindness is believed by critical race and
feminist scholars to foster continued subordination by focusing on for-
mal equality. This only scratches the surface of the race and gender
inequality in our country2' and does not provide the tools for ferreting
gration as domination through the imposition of white values and norms-universalist
meritocratic standards, for example, that privilege whites and maintain the subordination
of blacks and other people of color"). Cf. Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and
Losing It, 38 J. oF LEGAL EDUC. 47 (1988) ("Feminists have shown how ... assertions of
neutrality hide from view the use of a male norm for measuring claims of discrimination.").
18. See Duncan Kennedy, Frontier of Legal Thought III. A Cultural Pluralist Case for
Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DuKE L.J. 705, 733 (1990) ("Judgments of
merit are inevitably culturally and ideologically contingent because they are inevitably par-
adigm-dependent.").
'19. See Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You
Really Want to be a Role Model?, 89 MIcH. L. REv. 1222, 1224 (1991) ("Our acquiescence
in treating [the issue of minority representation] as a 'question of standards' is absurd and
self-defeating when you consider that we took no part in creating those standards and their
fairness is one of the very things we want to call into question."). Cf JOYCE A. LADNER,
ToMORROW's TOMORROW 414 (1971) (Ladner discusses how social methodology replicates
subordination: "The relationship between the (objective) researchers and his subjects re-
sembles that of the oppressor and the oppressed, because it is the oppressor who defines
the problem, the nature of the research, and to some extent the quality of the interaction
between him and his subjects.") (emphasis added).
20. Diana M. Poole, On Merit, 1 LAW & INEo. J. 155, 157 (1983) ("Merit is defined by
white men to reward what white men become. Merit, as we know it, explicitly values par-
ticular experiences and abilities-the ones developed by white upper class men-and
therefore implicitly devalues others .... [M]eritocracy calls those who conform to these
standards 'equal.' Those who are different, it calls 'unqualified."').
21. Neil Gotanda describes the technique of nonrecognition of difference:
Nonrecognition [of difference] is a technique, not a principle of traditional sub-
stantive common law or constitutional interpretation. It addresses the question of
setting forth an analytical methodology. This technical approach permits a court
to describe, to accommodate, and then to ignore issues of subordination. This
deflection from the substantive to the methodological is significant. Because the
technique appears purely procedural, its normative, substantive impact is hidden.
Color blind application of the technique is important because it suggests a seem-
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out deep-seated bias.' The battle over affirmative action is one facet
of this debate. The call to blind ourselves to difference and to back off
from questioning the nature and context of the development of the
current status of our "meritocracy" in the name of fairness, would
only promote maintenance of the status quo. 3
Critical race theorists have come under attack as advocating a
wholesale abdication of "merit-ideals". 24 However, this may be more
of a simplification of the critical race position than an accurate depic-
tion of its prescriptions. Scholars of color do not necessarily reject the
first principle of equality-the "concept" of merit-but rather may
question the "conception" of merit-the approach of color-blind
"meritocratists" who consistently devalue contributions made by these
scholars.' Advancing a monolithic characterization of critical race
ingly neutral and objective method of decisionmaking that avoids any considera-
tion of race.
Neil Gotanda, The Colorblind Constitution, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1, 17 (1990). Cf Kimberle
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, in FEMINIsT LEGAL
THEORY 383, 387 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993) (Crenshaw criticizes the feminist and anti-
racist conceptualization of discrimination: "Despite the narrow scope of [the] dominant
conception of discrimination and its tendency to marginalize those whose experiences can-
not be described within its tightly-drawn parameters, this approach has been regarded as
an appropriate framework for addressing a range of problems.").
22. One important development in the use of race-consciousness to extract racial
"meaning" from what appear to be otherwise neutral processes is Charles Lawrence's in-
vestigation into unconscious racism. See Charles Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 323 (1987).
23. See Cass Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 8 (1992):
[T]he attack on affirmative action takes ... as uncontroversial[,] existing distribu-
tions of benefits and burdens between blacks and whites. The attack rips the
notion of discrimination out of the context that gave the word its social meaning
and made it a term of opprobrium. The attack treats attention to context and
history as unprincipled.... [T]he prevailing conception of neutrality defines the
presence of government action by reference to existing distributions.
id.
24. See Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Is the Radical Critique of Merit Anti-Se-
mitic?, 83 CAL- L. Rv. 853, 862 n.47 (1995) ("[W]e feel justified in describing Critical
Race Theory as a whole as endorsing the more radical position of rejecting merit
entirely.").
25. RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's ErmiRE 71 (1986). Ronald Dworkin sets out the con-
cept/conception distinction:
The contrast between concept and conception is ... a contrast between levels of
abstraction at which the interpretation of the practice can be studied. At the first
level agreement collects around discrete ideas that are uncontroversially em-
ployed in all interpretations; at the second the controversy latent in this abstrac-
tion is identified and taken up. Exposing this structure may help to sharpen
argument and will in any case improve the community's understanding of its intel-
lectual environment.
Id See also RONALD DwomiRN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-36 (1978).
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and feminist scholars' "merit-philosophies" for any end, however,
would be inaccurate. Some of these theorists may in fact believe that
a neutral "meritocratic" ideal cannot exist, while others may believe
that neutral "meritocracy" is a valid ideal but that merit's current in-
carnation is non-neutral. Still other theorists may argue that existing
ideals may have neutral elements, but are applied in biased ways.
26
This Essay maintains that Outsiders may possess a "good," that
is, a form of merit which is valuable, not only for Outsiders them-
selves, but for the state as well. Consequently, the assertion of this
"good" rests on an assumption that Outsider merit can be positively
measured by some form of universal gauge-"it's good for me as well
as you"-and that the problem with the existing system is that it sim-
ply does not recognize and value these virtues because of the biased
political structure. For example, returning to the law school admis-
sions hypothetical,2 7 if I support Candidate B (the Latina with particu-
lar experience with discrimination, a demonstrated connection with
her ethnic community, and with lower numbers than Candidate A), I
am not abdicating merit ideals any more than the Supreme Court did
in Regents of University of California v. Bakke.28 In that case, the
Court presumed that based on number criteria alone, the reverse-dis-
crimination plaintiff was qualified enough to fairly deserve admittance
to medical school.29 I am simply asserting Candidate B's proper inclu-
sion into the realm of the "good." Instead of retreating to a smooth
surfaced number preference, one which glides over bumpy individual-
ism and avoids attending to the concrete details of lived experiences, I
am recognizing the value of particular experience with discrimination
and the ability to challenge that discrimination with productive action.
At hand is an attempt to transform the meritocratic ideal by in-
cluding what has been up to now excluded-the valuable, concrete
26. Lawrence Solum, Professor of Law, illuminated this point for me.
27. Supra notes 14, 15 and accompanying text.
28. 438 U.S. 265, 276-77 (1978).
29. I In analyzing the Court's holding, Cheryl I. Harris found that:
The majority of the [Bakke] Court was willing to validate Bakke's expectation
because the special admissions plan violated neutrality, when 'neutrality' was a
colorblind decision process based on 'objective merit.' ... [H]owever, the Court's
discussion about relative performance, measured by 'neutral' merit criteria,
masks its assumptions about the [number-centered] definitions of
merit .... [R]onald Dworkin has argued that Bakke's claim that his rejection
violated merit-based standards was unsubstantiated because ... [m]erit could in
fact mean something quite different, such as a probability that the individual
would make a contribution to the profession.
Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. Rnv. 1707, 1771 (1993) (citations
omitted).
lived experiences of oppressed peoples.3° However, this project will
require an examination of first, the original, non-neutral, and
politicized values against which white women and minorities are being
measured, and second, the alchemization of excluded voices and those
values. Embarking on this project, I will travel back in time to ob-
serve some initial articulations on merit, value, and virtue, and then
speed up closer to the present day to reflect on excluded constructions
of those ideals.
H. Aristotelian Constructions of Merit, or "Virtue"
Aristotle wrote that the notion of distributing power according to
merit was uncontroversial, although the definition of merit was con-
tested: "[T]hat what is just in distribution must be according to merit
in some sense, though they do not all specify the same sort of merit,
but democrats identify it with the status of freemen, supporters of oli-
garchy with wealth (or with noble birth) and supporters of aristocracy
with excellence."'" Aristotle, an aristocratist, aligns merit with vir-
tue,32 and provides a detailed account of their forms.
In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle posited that the good citizen
and the good person (who were one and the same) should be charac-
terized by a unity of moral and intellectual virtues. Two examples of
the moral virtues are courage and temperance,33 those things that cre-
ate the "good" or "happy" life.34 The moral virtues operate within the
30. This is within the critical race theory and feminist legal theory traditions. See, e.g.,
Yxta Maya Murray, The Cultural Meaning of Judicial Selection, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 374,
384-391 (1994) (examining how certain scholars reviewed Justice Clarence Thomas' merit,
ideology, and judicial fitness through a lens which attended to the concrete details of the
black experience).
31. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, ch. 3, p. 1131, col. a, 11. 26-29, reprinted
in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1006 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941).
32. This may be a contestable point since the conclusion that Aristotle equates merit
with virtue and excellence is never explicitly made in his ETHICS. But see David Keyt,
Aristotle's Theory of Distributive Justice, in A COMPANION TO ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS 259,
259 (David Keyt & Fred D. Miller, Jr. eds., 1991) ("[T]he standard of worth that Aristotle
ultimately endorses is 'virtue fully furnished with external means' (arete kechoregemene)"]
(citing ARISTOTLE, POLiTIcs bk. IV, ch. 1, p. 1289, col. a, 11. 31-33, reprinted in THE BASIC
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 31, at 1206-07.
33. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. II, ch.6, p. 1107, col. b, 11. 1-8, reprinted
in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 31, at 959-60; Lawrence Solum, Virtues
and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian Guide to Judicial Selection, 61 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1735,
1739 (1988) [hereinafter Solum, Virtues and Vices].
34. See Ronald Beiner, The Liberal Regime, 66 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 73,75 (1990) ("The
central thought of Aristotelian ethical theory is that human activities, for all their unques-
tioned diversity, are nonetheless governed from within; there is a center to human action;
there are patterns of coherence in human existence. The proper unit of moral analysis is
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realm of emotions and are held to be a "mean" between contrasting
emotive vices, such as courage's mediation between timidity and reck-
lessness.35  The virtues are also developed out of habitual experi-
ence.36  Aristotle further identified the intellectual virtues of
theoretical and practical wisdom. Theoretical wisdom "operates in
the realm of abstract thinking, science and theory. '37 Practical wis-
dom, known as phronesis, is "excellence in deliberation," "operates in
the realm of praxis, action in particular situations, '38 and is forged out
of practical experience. 9 Phronesis is the intellect's ability to guide
an individual to act appropriately, out of an understanding of the "sa-
lient features of a complex situation;" this understanding grows out of
"the long process of living and choosing." 40 Finally, Aristotle holds
the happy life."); see also IRis MURDOCH, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOOD 18 (1971) (discuss-
ing the roles of love and justice in the moral judgment); Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and
Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 885, 910
(1996) (discussing the "classical Aristotelian virtues such as liberality, courage and magna-
nimity"); PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES 8 (1978) (analyzing the virtues of courage
and temperance and contrasting them to justice); G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Phi-
losophy, in ETHICS (Judith J. Thomson & Gerald Dworkin, eds., 1968).
35. Solum, supra note 33 at 1739 (citing ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. III,
ch. 5, p. 115, col. a, ll. 7, reprinted in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 31, at
974) (Aristotle states that courage "is a mean with regard to feelings of fear and
confidence.").
36. See id. (Aristotle holds that moral virtue comes about as a result of habit.).
37. See Lawrence Solum, Virtues and Voices, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 111, 116-117
(1992) [hereinafter Solum, Virtues and Voices]; Solum, supra note 33, at 1739; HARDIE,
ARISTOTLE'S ETHICAL THEORY 116 (1980).
38. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VI, ch. 5, p. 1140, col. a, II. 25-27, reprinted
in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 31, at 1026 ("[T]he mark of a man of
practical wisdom [is] to be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for
himself."); Solum, Virtues and Voices, supra note 37 at 116-17.
39. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk VI, ch. 8, p. 1142, col. a, 1. 23, reprinted in
THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 31, at 1030 ("[Practical wisdom] is the ana-
logue of theoretical insight.") (quoted in MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE 74
(1990): "The content of rational choice must be supplied by nothing less messy than experi-
ence and stories of experience."); Solum, supra note 37, at 116-17 ("The intellectual virtues
are initially developed by teaching and mature through experience.").
As a further illumination of Aristotelian virtues, Steven Munzer defines Aristotle's
configuration of the virtues as one which targets characteristics that dispose individuals to
behave and think in ways that are beneficial for herself and for others. See MUNZER, infra
note 69 and accompanying text.
40. NUSSBAUM, supra note 39, at 75; see also NANCY SHERMAN, THE FABRIC OF
CHARACTER 15 (1989) ("[T]he impersonality of reason does not fix law as external or rigid,
but rather establishes it as an expression of ongoing and active reason. What is final is not
the deliverances of written law, but rather the 'best judgments' of those who, guided by
experience and the law, can improve upon it."); Lawrence Solum, Equity and the Rule of
Law, in THE RULE OF LAW 135-36 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994), ("Phronesis is the intellectual
component of the disposition to respond appropriately to particular situations.").
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that the virtues must be possessed in unity-that an individual pos-
sesses either all of the virtues, or none at all. 1
These virtues seem ineluctably neutral since they initially appear
as broad and abstract categories which are potentially all-inclusive.
They also seem to be irrefutably positive and productive characteris-
tics, upon which we would be eager to judge either a person or a soci-
ety.42 However, even these foundational values are not devoid of
ideological content. Aristotle, famously, constructed his paradigm of
virtues from the premise that they could only be attained by a privy
few. First, women and natural slaves could not possess the virtues "in
perfection.14 3 Further, the virtues could only be acquired by those
who had sufficient leisure time, namely, the upper class.
44
Interestingly, upon examination of some of Aristotle's listed vir-
tues, we see that they can evoke images similar to those evoked by the
language used in modem day delineations of merit such as the follow-
ing: intellectual "rigo[r]," "industr[y]," and "balanced dispositions."
45
Other definitions look to "dependability," the quality of being "hard
working," and the manifestation of fidelity.46 In addition, there exist
41. See HARDIE, supra note 37, at 116-17 ("The fact that Aristotle describes each vir-
tue separately must not be taken to imply that he thinks that a man can have one virtue
without having others as well. On the contrary he tells us ... that, while a man may have
the natural endowment which fits him for one virtue but not for another, virtue in the
proper sense is a unity.").
42. Solum, VIRTUES AND VoICES, supra note 37, at 117 ("The person who possesses
the virtues of temperance, courage, and wisdom will likely flourish, and a society composed
of such persons will also flourish.").
43. ARISTOTLE, POLrrIcs bk. I, ch. 13, p. 1260, col. a, 11. 12-20, reprinted in THi BASIC
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 31, at 1144.
[T]he slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, but it is without
authority .... [S]o it must necessarily be supposed to be with the moral virtues
also; all should partake of them, but only in such manner and degree as is re-
quired by each for the fulfillment of his duty. Hence the ruler ought to have
moral virtue in perfection.... [T]he subjects, on the other hand, require only that
measure of virtue which is proper to each of them.
Id. See also Solum, Virtues and Voices, supra note 37, at 127; Miriam Galston, Taking
Aristotle Seriously: Republican-Oriented Legal Theory and the Moral Foundation of Delib-
erative Democracy, 82 CAL. L. REV. 329, 396 (1994) ("Aristotle's proposals for an ideal or
best regime were highly exclusionary. Women and natural slaves were to be excluded from
participation in political life.").
44. Galston, supra note 43, at 396 ("Men who lacked a certain level of property and a
certain type of education and experience [were also to be excluded] ... [because] they
need leisure for acquiring virtue and engaging in political activity.").
45. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Rethinking Federal Judicial Selection, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv.
1257, 1274-75 (1993).
46. See IRs MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 204 (1990)
("One study of performance evaluation practices finds that evaluators of professional or
managerial performance commonly rely on assessment of broadly defined traits such as
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modem examples of the ideological content of these measures. Aris-
totle's assertion that only the privileged few can access virtue bears an
uncomfortable resemblance to current day conservative thinkers' pro-
nouncements that poor, single mothers (of color) are devoid of moral
and work ethic "virtue," and that their lack of this kind of merit is so
powerful that they signify "this nation's most dangerous time
bomb."'47 By focusing the issue of minority and female need through a
moral lens and by using these reductions to justify a severing of criti-
cally needed welfare benefits that women and minorities need to
maintain participation in public life,48 these modem day thinkers
come close to imitating Aristotle's most racist and sexist reflections on
the distance "others" keep from the virtues needed to become a
citizen.
I see Aristotle's delineation of the virtues necessary to attain the
good or happy life as being strongly connected to the modem debate
over affirmative action and the meaning of merit. There is a construc-
tion of value in both Aristotelian moral theory and the antiaffirmative
action stance which initially appears to be neutral, productive, and
leadership, initiative, cooperation, judgment, creativity and dependability."). Other defini-
tions of merit can seem more inchoate, often referring obliquely to "excellence," but many
articulations of merit seem to refer back to industry and devotion. See, e.g. Richard H.
Fallon Jr., To Each According to His Ability, From None According to His Race: The Con-
cept of Merit in the Law of Antidiscrimination, 60 B.U. L. REv. 815,815 n.1 (1980) ("[Merit
means] any quality or achievement, typically regarded as an indication of excellence, that
makes fitting the bestowal of some desired benefit or reward."); Randall Kennedy, Racial
Critiques of LegalAcademia, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1745, 1806 (1989) ("'[Mjerit' is an honor-
ific term that identifies a quality of accomplishment that has been achieved; it does not
refer to inherited characteristics such as race or gender."); Sanford Levison and J.M.
Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1597, 1614 n.64 (1991)
(emphasizing "faithful[ness]" in a brief essay comparing merit in art and legal scholarship);
John E. Morrison, Colorblindness, Individuality, and Merit, 79 IowA L. REv. 313, 330
(1994) ("The concept of merit is just as ambiguous as the concepts of both race and social
relationships.... [but some define it as] [h]ard work and good results.").
For the connection between Aristotelian moral theory and the meaning of merit, see
Fallon, at 815 n.1 ("Aristotle, who argued forcefully for the equation of merit with excel-
lence or virtue, also noted the contestable and contested meaning of the term-the ulti-
mate source of many... issues and confusion.").
47. See Wilson Makes Renewed Callfor Moral Values, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1996, at Al,
A13 ("'All the problems tearing apart the fabric of our society have deep roots in this
exploding epidemic of out-of-wedlock births.... [Conservative thinkers have] identifi[ed]
out-of-wedlock births as the nation's most dangerous time bomb."). Cf. Regina Austin,
Sapphire Bound! in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 575 (Patricia Smith ed., 1993) ("[T]he con-
demnation of black unwed motherhood is so deeply embedded in mainstream thought that
its invocation in connection with teenage pregnancy may be considered uncontroversial.").
48. See Wilson Makes Renewed Call for Moral Values, supra note 47, at 13 ("Wilson
proposed to discourage unwed mothers with a plan to stop additional welfare benefits for
women who have babies while they are receiving public assistance.").
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positive. For example, Aristotle identifies courage, temperance, and
justice as three important virtues. Similarly, the modem terms used to
define merit focus on broad, noncontextual features such as faithful-
ness or industry.49 In fact, even the professions which seem most ame-
nable to merit quantification loosely define some seemingly neutral
qualifies that are considered desirable, such as the ability to contribute
to the profession,5 ° moral character,5' or "interpersonal skills."5
However, on closer examination, the validity of these standards is
questionable. What are the particular definitions of courage, justice,
temperance, and phronesis, as they have been defined in the absence
of other voices? Are these definitions wholly accurate and fairly ap-
plied to others? For example, Aristotle's particular conception of
courage reveals the danger of defining virtues in exclusion: "[T]he
courage ... of a man and of a woman, are not ... the same; the
courage of a man is shown in commanding, of a woman in obeying."53
Similar challenges might be made to antiaffirmative action theorists,
who depend on what sometimes appears to be the monolithic justifica-
tion of color-blind merit. Armed with a gender and race conscious-
ness, modem critical race and feminist scholars may ask: How has the
definition of merit been exclusively constructed, and is it also fairly
applied to others?
These questions move back towards the entrenched assumptions
about what it means to be "good," pulling strenuously at long held
truths regarding what is "valuable." However, these sorts of voyages
are not without their perils; they need methods. But, anchors do exist
as critical race theorists and feminist theorists have developed some
tools for analyzing our modem definition of merit. One of the most
important contributions of these bodies of scholarship is their at-
tempts to peel back the layers of foundational "truth," bringing to
light underlying assumptions which are, inevitably, "white-centered"
49. See, supra notes 33, 40, 45, and 46.
50. Harris, supra note 29, at 1771 (discussing medical school admission in Bakke).
51. See Aiken v. City of Memphis, 37 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 n.7 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing a
regulation which specifies the qualifications for the position of patrol officer, one of which
is that the applicant "have a good moral character"); Drayton v. City of St. Petersburg, 477
F. Supp. 846, 851 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (good moral character requirement for police officers
and firefighters).
52. See Blum, infra note 120.
53. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics bk. I, ch. 13, p. 1260, col.a, 11. 22-24, reprinted
in Tim BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 31, at 1144.
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and "male-centered."54 One of the main tools so developed has been
storytelling, which "Outsider," or "from the bottom"55 jurisprudence
use in order to "subvert . . . in group reality [and] destroy[]
mindset.
' 56
The task I have in mind is to use storytelling-in particular, bio-
graphical stories about my Mexican-American grandmother, my
mother, and myself-in order to examine whether the concept of
merit, or, in Aristotle's terms, "virtue," may be reconfigured by the
inclusion of previously silenced voices, whose stories may contain con-
crete, particular details illuminating modes of value which largely
have been ignored. 7 This project is consistent with the commitment
of critical race and feminist scholars, and is also in line with the struc-
54. See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Foreword- Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in
Legal Education, 11 NAT'L BLAcK L.J. 1, 2 (1989) (examining the law school culture and
positing that it embodies a false assumption of perspectivelessness); see also supra note 17.
55. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Repara-
tions, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323 (1987).
56. See Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narra-
tive, 87 Mic. L. REv. 2411, 2413 (1988) ("Stories, parables, chronicles, and narratives are
powerful means for destroying mindset-the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms,
and shared understandings against a background of which legal and political discourse
takes place.").
Narrative scholarship, particularly that coming from critical race and feminist legal
scholars, strives to dismantle the notion that the law operates from an objective standpoint,
one that "envisions scholars [and lawyers] achieving an unbiased and universal perspective
by distancing themselves from the social reality they seek to describe." Charles Lawrence,
The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2231,
2252 (1992); see also Williams, supra note 16, at 6 ("I am trying to challenge the usual limits
of commercial discourse by using an intentionally double-voiced and relational, rather than
a traditionally legal black-letter, vocabulary."). West notes that:
[S]ome legal thought confuse[s] ...male experience with 'human' experi-
ence ... because women have not made clear that our day-to-day, lived experi-
ence . . .is incommensurable with men's [posits that] [w]e need to flood the
market with our own stories until we get one simple point across: men's narrative
story and phenomenological description of law is not women's story and phenom-
enology of law. We need to dislodge legal theorists' confidence that they speak
for women, and we need to fill the gap that will develop when we succeed in
doing so.
Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 65 (1988).
57. Feminist jurisprudence and critical race theory value attentions to the concrete
details of everyday life. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63
S. CAL. L. Rzv. 1699, 1706 (1990) ("Pragmatism and feminism largely share, I think, the
commitment to finding knowledge in the particulars of experience. It is a commitment
against abstract idealism, transcendence, foundationalism, and nontemporal universality
and in favor of imminence, historicity, concreteness, situatedness, contextuality, embed-
dedness, [and] narrativity of meaning."); John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie
Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65
S. CAL. L. REv. 2129, 2146 (1992) (discussing "critical race theory's experiential
grounding").
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ture of Aristotelian method. First, critical race theory and feminist
theories have unabashedly announced their commitment to disturbing
foundational assumptions. In addition, Aristotelian moral theory,
which itself has provided one of the foundations for an exclusive defi-
nition of merit, is also open to this kind of method. Although this
Essay critiques the gender and race hierarchy that underlying Aristo-
telian moral theory, it also uses Aristotle's identification of the virtues
as a theoretical framework for delineating the distinctive merits of
Outsiders. For example, Aristotle placed significant emphasis on the
value of phronesis-practical experience in the development of "wis-
dom" and "understanding," 5 8-which can be a valuable tool for un-
covering valuable Outsider wisdom stemming from personal
experience with subordination.59 Further, as interpreted by Martha
Nussbaum, using biographical stories in order to flesh out the virtues
has been considered consistent with Aristotle's moral philosophy:
"[T]he content of rational choice must be supplied by nothing less
messy than experience and stories of experience. Among stories of
conduct, the most true and informative will be works of literature,
biography, and history .... "60
Using "from the bottom" storytelling in order to illuminate a new
configuration of merit, however, is not uncontroversial in Aristotelian
moral theory. In the first place, the concept of Outsider merit directly
conflicts with Aristotle's assertion that Outsiders could not possess
virtue. In addition, an attempt to discern particular virtues may con-
tradict Aristotle's conception of the unity of the virtues. Since some
Outsiders may possess certain virtues but not others due to their ex-
cluded status (good temper, for example), the resultant notion of dis-
tinct virtues challenges Aristotle's rule of unity.61
A debate between Nussbaum and my colleague, Lawrence So-
lum, reveals the tensions that arise when Outsiders attempt to recast
the Aristotelian model. Outsiders presumptively do not have access
to the qualities, or experiences, that could be considered virtuous-
"virtuous" in the abstract (the broad categories of "courage," "tem-
58. NuSSEAUM, supra note 39, 74-75 ("[Aristotle] stresses the importance of experi-
ence in giving content to practical wisdom, developing a contrast between practical insight
and scientific or mathematical understanding .... [Piractical perception ... is gained only
through a long process of living and choosing that develops the agent's resourcefulness and
responsiveness .... "). See also Linda R. Hirshman, The Book of "A", 70 TEx. L. REv. 971
(1992) (noting parallels between feminism and Aristotelian moral theory).
59. See infra note 118, and accompanying text.
60. NUSSBAUM, supra note 39, at 74.
61. See Solum, Virtues and Voices, supra note 37, at 133-34; see also supra note 41.
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perance," "justice," or "industry and devotion," as the virtues have
been recently cast in the merit debate)62 or "virtuous" in the particu-
lar (those qualities in context). Solum, in his article Virtues and
Voices,63 wonders whether
the experiences of oppression and exclusion may lead to the de-
velopment of states of character that lead to moral action, to the
right sort of choosing. Those who are privileged (the included
and unoppressed) may not develop these virtues merely by be-
ing informed of the propositional content of the distinctive
knowledge of the oppressed. Experiences of oppression may
not be necessary for the recognition of injustice, but it seems
plausible that those who actually experience oppression will
have ethical perceptions that are different from those who rec-
ognize injustice in other ways, e.g. through theoretical discourse
about justice.'
Nussbaum, however, prefers to think of Outsiders as having access
only to special "knowledge" which is relevant to good deliberation.
I am rather nervous, about the idea that the excluded have vir-
tues of their own just because of the excluded and oppressed
way of life they have led .... [Outsiders] can lose, [Aristotle]
claims, many of the major virtues, because they become incapa-
ble of trust or hope. This, to me, is more persuasive than the
idea that exclusion generates new virtues.
65
Although Nussbaum's articulation of the Aristotelian position as
being incapable of trust or hope may be striking, it is not without a
modem day analogue.66 This is, to me, one of the reasons why revi-
sion or merit-teaching must occur, since standards which presump-
tively find Outsiders lacking point more to the insufficiency of the
standards than to our own merit. This is not to say, however, that all
standards of merit must be abolished. Revolution is better asserted in
increments,67 and abdicating all standards may only leave the majority
62. See id
63. See iAt
64. Id. at 137.
65. Martha Nussbaum, Comments, 66 CHi.-KNrr L. R v. 213, 228 (1990).
66. Posner notes the antiaffirmative action position:
[S]uppose[s] that a particular racial or ethnic identity is correlated with character-
istics that are widely disliked for reasons not patently exploitative, noncompeti-
tive, or irrational. A substantial proportion of the members of the group may be
loud, poor, hostile, irresponsible, poorly educated, dangerously irascible, or ill
mannered, and have different tastes, values, and work habits from our own, or
speak an unintelligible patois.
Posner, supra note 13, at 367-68.
67. Cf Radin, supra note 57, at 1700-01 (positing that feminism should not abdicate
"the new epistemology" because it had been developed by men, but finding that "it is
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with the conclusion that Outsiders are simply incapable of meeting
any standards whatsoever.68
An additional objection to the identification of Outsiders' distinct
virtues is the requirement that there be a unity of the "virtues." How-
ever, this may not wholly preclude, within the Aristotelian model, an
articulation of the particular virtues of the oppressed. To the extent
that Outsiders respond to their excluded status through self-destruc-
tiveness, bad temper, et cetera, Aristotle's theory would refuse to rec-
ognize them as virtuous, despite their manifestations of other forms of
virtue. However, the project of identifying distinct virtues does not
itself necessarily break Aristotelian unity.
For example, Stephen Munzer, in his book A Theory of Prop-
erty,69 writes that general virtues can be "variably instantiated" and
displayed in different ways depending on the society.7 0 He also asserts
that there are "localized virtues," that are "virtues only in some socie-
ties,"71 and "differentiated virtues," that are "virtues for persons who
occupy certain roles or positions but need not be virtues for persons
who occupy different roles or positions." 7 This does not mean that
the different "virtues" do not conform to a unified program, but
rather are simply the articulation of broad categories of virtue in con-
text.73 Biographical narrative is a helpful tool in the excavation of
these contextual virtues as it can unearth concrete illustrations of ac-
tual, "every day," lived experiences with inequities, thus uncovering
valuable responses and perceptions that may otherwise be
overlooked.74
pragmatically better" for excluded voices to be affirmed, and consequently enabled, (in
pragmatism's case) to articulate the problem of "bad coherence").
68. See Farber & Sherry, supra note 24.
69. STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY (1990).
70. 1d at 123 ("For example," Munzer writes, "consider two societies that have differ-
ent conceptions of kindness toward the elderly when they become terminally and painfully
ill. One society performs euthanasia... and the other allows their lives to run a natural
course while treating them gently and respectfully.").
71. Id- (differentiating between the need for "industry" in a society where resources
are readily obtainable and in a society with scarce resources).
72. Id. at 124 ("Some might contend that in a feudal society, obedience and docility
are virtues for serfs and not for nobles, whereas boldness is a virtue for nobles but not for
serfs.").
73. Id. at 121, 124 (All the different "virtues" must qualify as "virtue," that is, a char-
acteristic which benefits its owner and others, and enhances positive features or corrects
shortcomings.).
74. Cf. Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Editorial Introduction to LAW IN EVERY-
DAY LIFE 2, 10 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds. 1993) (noting "the contingency and
specificity of the relationship of law and everyday life" and observing that "[our] under-
standings, conventions, and assumptions are themselves produced and shaped by legal
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These objections aside, the use of the biographical narrative of
Mexican-American immigrants to investigate different meanings of
merit fits in well with this project, since narrative and storytelling are
firmly rooted in the Chicano tradition.75 That I am using biographical
narratives of Mexican-Americans in this Essay is not incidental to my
project. Although my exploration of merit and virtue is intended to
supplement the debate on affirmative action-broadly construed to
mean not only affirmation for Chicanos but also other Outsiders-an
examination of the meaning of merit in the Chicano life is of particu-
lar importance as the status of the Chicano is in need of increased
jurisprudential attention.
The Chicano experience has largely been included in the civil
rights movement and critical race theory, but without sufficient expla-
nation of what discrimination, oppression, or "outsider-ness" means in
that experience. Chicano claims of oppression and exclusion have
been fit into the same framework as race claims,
76 poverty claims, 77
ethnicity claims,78 and gender claims.79 However, a more incisive ex-
amination of Chicanos would reveal that the discrimination against
rules and practices"); Hendrik Hartog, Abigail Bailey's Coverture: Law in a Married Wo-
man's Consciousness, supra at 65 (reflecting on "the role of legal values and legal institu-
tions in the shaping of ordinary social identities" by "attend[ing] to" the 1815
autobiography of Abigail Bailey). Cf RAMON SALDIVAR, CHICANO NARRATIVE 154-155
(1990) ("[A]utobiography can be used to advance a critical attitude toward social institu-
tions, turning what seems an inherently private form of discourse onto the public social
world. . . . 'Autobiography certainly has a great historical value in that it shows life in
action and not just as written laws or dominant moral principles say it should be."').
75. See SALDIVAR, supra note 74, at 32 ("Because the corrido is 'narrative, reflexive,
and propositional in semantic intent and poetic in technique,' it lends itself readily to use as
an instrument of ideological analysis.") (citation omitted).
76. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 356 (1991) (The Supreme Court used
both the terms "race" and "ethnicity" in an equal protection claim regarding jury selection
involving Latinos.); see also Deborah Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of
Trial by Jury De Medietae Linguae: A History and a Proposal for Change, 74 B.U. L. Rev.
777, 818 (1994) ("Within 'race' I include Latinos, African-Americans, Asians, and Native
Americans.").
77. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
78. See Hernandezv. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954) (In an equal protection challenge
to jury exclusion, the Court asserted that its decision to strike down the exclusion of Mexi-
can-Americans in jury selection did not mean that it was "reviv[ing] the rejected conten-
tion that the Fourteenth Amendment requires proportional representation of all the
component ethnic groups of the community on every jury."); see also Hernandez v. New
York, 500 U.S. at 356.
79. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflection on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE
L.J. 1281, 1301 (1991) (considering the forced sterilization of Latinas when discussing how
reproductive policy serves male interests); Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex
Female Subject, 92 MicH. L. REv. 2479,2521-22 (1994) (considering discrimination against
Latinas and the 'sex-plus' doctrine under Title VII).
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them cannot be so easily described, and the reasons for their exclusion
may vary greatly from case to case. Chicanos are not simply Outsiders
because of their race, ethnicity, skin color, class, or language; each of
these factors blends together with gender in different ways for differ-
ent Chicanos.
Accordingly, this Essay seeks to begin to illustrate some aspects
of the complex nature of discrimination against Chicanos through bio-
graphical storytelling, and to draw out the distinct merit that exists in
these Latinas' responses to their difficult circumstances. By analyzing
these stories under the rubric of past discrimination, role modeling,
and diversity, I will focus in on the ways in which such "colored" merit
is developed, and how it can be deployed. In the first narrative, I will
analyze my grandmother's life in an effort to identify instances of
merit that are forged out of experiences of past discrimination. In so
doing I will not only be performing the radical act of defining produc-
tive responses to subordination as "meritorious," but I will also posit
how this merit, which has been understood only in the private realm,
also has potential public uses. In the second two narratives, which
focus on my mother's story-and my own, I will examine how Outsider
merit can be deployed through role modeling and diversity concepts.80
HI. The Stories
A. Past Discrimination
We recognize the need for careful judicial evaluation to assure
that any... program that employs racial or ethnic criteria to
accomplish the objective of remedying the present effects of past
discrimination is narrowly tailored to the achievement of that
goal.8 '
The Court in Fullilove had nothing so ethereal in mind as story-
telling and the investigation of Outsider virtues or merit when it held
that affirmative action plans (there, a ten-percent set-aside for minor-
ity-owned businesses) had to be narrowly tailored to the goal of reme-
dying past discrimination. But past discrimination is a useful lens
through which to examine Outsiders' abilities to contribute to society.
80. An important caveat, however, does need to be made. This Essay does not pur-
port to define all Outsider merit. It does not even attempt to further a claim of Latino or
Latina virtue. Rather, it is an individual examination of the incidents of merit in a particu-
lar family-mine-which would likely be ignored under a color- or gender-blind analysis.
By examining specific Latina lives I hope to unearth merit which is directly informed by
race and gender.
81. Fullilove v. Klutznik, 448 U.S. 448, 480 (1983).
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As noted, Aristotle placed heavy emphasis on the centrality of
actual, lived experience in the development of virtue.8 Similarly,
some modem scholars emphasize practical experience in their defini-
tions of merit.83 Outsiders' experiences with discrimination and sub-
ordination can give them a richer perspective and highly sophisticated
coping tools that the majority simply has not acquired. Take, for ex-
ample, my grandmother, Maria Aldrete Adastik. She was born in
1924, in Coahuila, Mexico, in the small city of La Villita which bor-
dered on Texas. "The town was named after my Grandfather, Vil-
lareal," she tells me, proudly adding, "he owned the whole place." 8
My grandmother is a small woman, like I am, who talks with her
hands, making swift, geometric shapes in the air. She can laugh her-
self to tears at her own jokes and memories. She has brown eyes and
medium skin, "Spanish skin," with barely a trace of mestizo. She dyes
her dark hair red, lightening it as many Mexican women do, and her
voice is a thick, accented music. We are sitting on the couch in my
living room; my grandfather is quiet and unseen in the study reading
the paper. With a tape deck on the table and me asking pointed ques-
tions, this is a different kind of conversation from any we have had
before. We are discussing how she grew up in Mexico, married and
had her only child there, and how she met the man I call my grandfa-
ther, Walter Adastik, who brought her over the border: the person
who, by marrying her, helped her become an American citizen.
In my family it has become customary to speak of some great
status and wealth once enjoyed by our blood line in small, dusty
towns; that we were wealthy, high class, and owned acres of property
and cattle; that we had haciendas and maids. These mythic things did
not last very long. They ended with my great-grandfather's death at
the age of thirty (he was Paco Aldrete, a stern looking, dark-haired
man whom I know only from old, sepia-toned photographs), which
left my great-grandmother, Otila, my grandmother, Maria, and her six
82. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
83. A reference to the concept of judicial "merit" is helpful here. See Tobias, supra
note 45, at 1274; STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FED-
ERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 152 (1994) (asserting that an examination of a judicial nom-
inee's day-to-day experience with minorities reveals something important about that
candidate's moral character, an important element of judicial merit); Murray, supra note
30, at 382 (positing that some objections to then-Supreme Court Justice nominee Judge
Clarence Thomas focused on his youth and inexperience).
84. Interview with Maria Aldrete Adastik in Pasadena, Cal. (June 27, 1995). Quota-
tions attributed to "my grandmother" or "Maria" throughout the remainder of this Essay
refer to this interview, but, at the request of the author, will not be individually cited in an
attempt to preserve the narrative flow of these sections.
sisters alone and in debt, forced to sell off the ranches and the cattle
and to try to find work.
Two years later, when my grandmother was sixteen, she married a
family friend. After several months, Maria became pregnant. "It was
normal then to have the babies when we were that age," she says,
comfortably. "In those years, marriage at sixteen or seventeen was
normal. Even Shirley Temple married at seventeen. See, so even the
movie stars was married earlier."
When Maria discovered that her new husband was having affairs
with other women, she decided to separate from him, even though she
was only sixteen and two months pregnant. She had her baby, my
mother, Thelma Diaz, and moved to Nueva Rosita, a different state in
Mexico, to be with her mother and sisters, all of whom lived in the
same apartment. Maria found work as an orderly in a hospital.
Maria's life choices-the decision to try and divorce her husband,
to have a child out of wedlock, to work-meant that she was to spend
the next six years confined to very stringent rules, imposed by both
Mexican society and by her estranged husband:
They were very, very strict society. Very strict. I couldn't go out
anywhere because I was not divorced. I was separated. He
didn't want to divorce me, he was hoping that I would go back
to him. And he would not support Thelma, either. And he said
that if he see me in any parties, or dancing, or in company of
another man, he will take Thelma away from me.
"Would he be able to do that?" I ask her. I cannot imagine what
would have happened to our family's history if this man had carried
out his threats.
"He will. Yes, legally," she answers, "because he have the money
to pay lawyers, for those things like that. Even if he steal her. I was
afraid. So I spend five or six years going nowhere."
Eventually her first husband divorced her, and Maria and her
family moved to Monterrey. After working for seven years, as a su-
pervisor in Monterrey's Social Security department Maria became in-
volved in a "pen-pal" program designed to connect Anglo men with
willing Latinas. She soon began writing letters to my grandfather,
Walter Adastik. He was a quiet man from Michigan. A mechanic.
Bilingual. They arranged a meeting in Mexico. It was 1955, and Ei-
senhower was the President of the United States.
Walter came to Monterrey for one week, renting out a hotel room
and taking Maria out to dinners, lunches, and for ice cream cones.
The young couple was always chaperoned by watchful, protective
Otila, although Maria was thirty years old and herself a mother. At
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the end of the week Maria agreed to marry Walter and move to the
United States, even though that same week she had been offered a
promotion at her job.
"Wasn't that awfully quick?" I ask, astonished that their forty
year marriage could have been premised on a one week courtship.
"Didn't you want to take the promotion?"
"No. There was no other answer. When my mother saw Walter,"
Maria explains, speaking of my great-grandmother,
[S]he told me "You are going to be a fool if you let him go out
without marry." She thought he was a good man, honest, and
nice; he is the best person I met. I thought the same thing.
Even if I didn't know him. I had a feeling.
"Were you happy that he was an American?" I ask.
To this my grandmother responds with a very organized answer,
lucid and rational, demonstrating the cost-benefit analysis in which
she has been engaging all of her life.
There are two big reasons-the first one, more important. In
Mexico, if you are alone, especially divorced (because they for-
give you if you are widow) if you are divorced, you are at fault.
If you are a woman. A man, they're saints, okay? They don't
do anything wrong. Whatever they do is okay. If you are di-
vorced, you have to be very careful what you do, what you say,
how you dress, everything. Take care of your surroundings.
Taking care of what the people think. Because whatever you do
is wrong. For another, I have Thelma. And usually... a di-
vorced woman has that bad reputation, no matter what. You are
dead. So you are like that, no one is gonna marry your daugh-
ters with a good intentions. Even if she start dating, the first
thing they going to try is to take her to bed because the mother
is divorced. "So let's try the girl." Never fails. Unless you are a
multimillionaire. So the best thing is to marry an American.
It was arranged that Maria would meet Walter in Tijuana, so that
he could bring her over the border, and they would be married in Los
Angeles. She flew down to Tijuana-a city she had never seen
before-and it was exotic, filled with merchants, strangers, and build-
ings. Maria had come alone, planning to send for Thelma after she
was married and had settled into her new life.
But Walter was late to the airport. Seven hours late, leaving Ma-
ria waiting at the terminal for two hours and then sitting for five hours
in a hotel lobby, a meeting spot they had previously discussed. After
waiting so many hours she thought that Walter had decided against




My grandmother tells me the thoughts that were running through
her mind that night while she waited in the lobby, glancing about for
any sign of Walter. "He doesn't want to marry me," she thought. She
is crying as she remembers this:
What to do. That means I have to go back to Monterrey with
empty hands, and I was feeling so bad. What I'm going to tell
my friends? What I'm going to tell my family? I felt so bad that
I said I'm not going back. I am not going back, so I'm going to
stay here. I will send for Thelma.
Walter eventually arrived at the hotel, explaining that traffic was
the reason for his late arrival. "The plane arrived at four-thirty; at
four-thirty he was at Culver City, working," she says, remembering
how her new fiance had miscalculated transportation time. Forty
years later, she is still aggravated at the thought. The next day they
made what is considered in our family a historic trip over the border.
"I feel good. I feel very happy," she says, remembering the crossing-
over. This was the beginning of my maternal Mexican-American line-
age. Maria and Walter married, brought Thelma across, and began
life together in a tract house in Lakewood, a small, unassuming Cali-
fornia suburb about an hour away from Los Angeles.
Maria's story, at first glance, may simply seem like an ambigu-
ously sad tale: Should she have taken the promotion? Did she pick
the right man? However, within her story I see strains of virtuous,
empathetic moral reasoning, and the ability to take tough, productive
action in the face of a seemingly intractable situation. I also see the
profound ability to adapt while maintaining personal integrity. These
characteristics as expressed in Maria's story are consistent with the
ideals of Aristotelian virtue, which Stephen Munzer defines as a
"character trait that disposes a person to think or act in ways that are
generally beneficial both for the person having the trait and for
others, and that either enhances some positive feature or corrects or
modifies some shortcoming[s] of human beings."85 Further, the char-
acteristics I have noted are also consistent with the broad, modern
definition of merit, which focuses on fidelity, dedication, and
tenacity.86
1. Empathy
First, my grandmother's response to her oppressive circumstances
in Mexico-rejecting a promotion at a job she enjoyed and by which
85. MUNZER, supra note 69, at 121.
86. See supra notes 37.
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she felt affirmed, and pragmatically marrying a suitable American-is
traced to her empathetic sense of responsibility to her own daughter.
Maria was trapped; she knew that. She was precluded from living the
sort of social life which seemed necessary for a young woman's
healthy development, yet it was concern for her daughter's future
which guided her decisionmaking. From her experiences as a di-
vorced, and consequently ostracized, woman in an insular society, Ma-
ria knew the costs of being labeled a deviant. She also knew how
those same costs-seclusion, isolation, objectification ("Let's get the
girl")-would come to bear on own her daughter by virtue of their
shared blood. It was because of this empathetic responsibility that
Maria made her sacrifices.
This empathy, forged out of personal experiences with subjuga-
tion, is a form of merit currently unrecognized by the majority of soci-
ety. However, if our society is concerned with eliminating bias and
discrimination, as it should be,87 then we should reconfigure our defi-
nition of merit to include the ability to perceptively and productively
recognize and respond to discrimination. As Robin West writes:
The ability to sympathetically understand (and respond to)
anothe[r] ... implies ... the ability to interpersonally compare
subjective utilities, as well as the ability to act on
them .... [K]nowledge of the other's subjectivity can then be-
come the basis of our comparison of the intensity of the pain felt
by that human being with that of another, or of our-
selves.... Further, it is the comparison... which determines my
final moral commitment ... to resist the suffering inflicted upon
this woman, or upon... [this man because I know] their pain is
greater or weightier than the suffering of others."
Personal experience with oppression is central to the formation of
this empathetic capacity. The person who experiences subjugation has
more than an abstract or theoretical knowledge about the plight of
Outsiders. Instead, he or she will have felt the burden of oppres-
87. Most political leaders from both ends of the political spectrum do seem to assert
this goal. See Wilson Filed Affirmative Action Suit, UPI, Aug. 10, 1995, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File (The article quotes Governor Wilson's statement that "[w]e
should have the same system of fairness for all Californians; one that does not play favor-
ites, one that does not legislate outcomes, but one that allows every hard-working citizen to
be recognized and rewarded on individual merit and individual achievement without re-
gard to race or ethnicity."); Bill Clinton, The Results of a White House Review of Federal
Affirmative Action Programs (July 19, 1995) (transcript available through Federal Docu-
ment Clearing House, Inc.) ("The purpose of affirmative action is to give our nation a way
to finally address the systemic exclusion of individuals of talent on the basis of their gender
or race from opportunities to develop, perform, achieve and contribute.").
88. Robin West, Taking Preferences Seriously, 64 TUL. L. REv. 659, 681-682 (1990).
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sion-what Toni Morrison calls "the adult pain that rested somewhere
under the eyelids, somewhere under th[e] head rags and soft felt hats,
somewhere in the palm of the hand, somewhere behind the frayed
lapels, somewhere in the sinew's curve."8 9 The experience of this
deep, almost physically felt, emotion makes it possible for an Outsider
to get "inside the skin" or to "step into the shoes" of another
Outsider.
For example, Maria understood that in her community, marital
separation could mean great danger for a woman's well-being, not
only because estranged husbands could respond violently, but also be-
cause estranged wives and their daughters were devalued by the larger
society. "Whatever you do is wrong" and "you are dead," are the
words she used to describe the divorced woman's status. Her em-
pathetic perception of a woman's vulnerability after divorce-a per-
ception which includes the understanding that men could "legally"
take away children from their ex-wives because they "have the money
to pay lawyers, for those things like that"-is a valuable resource in a
society where women are disadvantaged by divorce. 90 Maria under-
stands not only the immediate, external inequities of marital separa-
tion, but also its less visible forms of oppression-alienation and fear
caused by change in status and increased vulnerability-which may
not always be taken into account by privileged policymakers who have
never been exposed to these conditions. 91
89. TONI MORRISON, SuLA 4 (1973).
90. Scholars and other commentators have observed how divorce reforms do not accu-
rately reflect or compensate for the lived inequities faced by divorced women.
Marital-property laws rest on the premise that husband and wife are equal part-
ners in marriage .... Without entering the equal treatment versus equal results
debate, one can recognize that compensating for the disparate positions of hus-
band and wife at divorce by presuming that they do not exist begs the question.
Bea Ann Smith, The Partnership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68 TEx.
L. REv. 689, 732 (1990) (citations omitted); Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87
MicH. L. REv. 797,838 (1989) (Although not advocating a maternal presumption, Williams
notes that "[s]cholars have found that the abolition of the maternal presumption in child-
custody decisions has had ... deleterious impacts on women.... [I]n the 90 percent of the
cases where mothers received custody, mothers often find themselves bargaining away fi-
nancial claims in exchange for custody of the children.").
91. See supra note 90. This reflection regarding the public-policy value of Maria's
learned wisdom also appears to be related to the Aristotelian position that wisdom and
excellence of character go hand in hand: "Without wisdom, excellence of character would
be like a man groping in the dark and not knowing where to go; without the desires of an
excellent character, wisdom would have nothing to do." J.O. URMSON, ARISTOTL'S ETH-
ics 84 (1988).
Maria's experiences with hardship are worth valuing because they can serve as a bea-
con for policymakers and lawmakers. Inclusion of Outsiders' experiences can guard
against the current "groping in the dark" which is evidenced by short-sighted welfare and
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Maria is also able to empathize with the plights of Outsiders, es-
pecially those who suffer subjugation from a combination of "intersec-
tional" factors,92 such as race, ethnicity, language barriers, and gender.
The need for welfare, education, and access to a forum are depriva-
tions that Maria has experienced as a single mother, a new immigrant,
and a non-English speaking "mail-order bride" of sorts. These exper-
iences permit Maria to transcend the stereotyped images of welfare
queens and thieving "illegals" competing against the story of the eco-
nomically disadvantaged white man so often espoused by the major-
ity's one-dimensional rhetoric of "rights." 93  My grandmother
consistently demonstrates this empathy through her responses to the
plights of others in need: myself, my mother, the neighbor, the wo-
man on the street, the alien crossing the border. "They don't get what
they need," she once said to me, when we were talking about the con-
dition of undocumented workers after the passage of Proposition 187.
"Peoples don't care about them. All their doors are closed. They
need at least one door open."
2. Praxis and Dignity
My grandmother's story also reveals her ability to take produc-
tive action while retaining her sense of self, qualities which may not
always be recognized as a form of merit. Within the debate of the
existence of the "virtues of the oppressed" lies a division over whether
Outsiders merely have special "knowledge," or indeed may possess
their own, unappreciated forms of merit.9 4 After relating this part of
my grandmother's story, I am convinced that she offers more than
mere "knowledge." Maria's understanding of her own situation and
her commitment to a better life, both for herself and for her daughter,
motivated the demonstration of her ability to take productive, adap-
tive, resistant action in the face of intractability.95 Although Maria's
response to her oppression may not be immediately recognizable as
divorce policies that fail to take into account the lack of equality between married men and
women and the sacrifices that some women will make in order to retain custody of their
children. See supra note 90.
92. See Crenshaw, supra note 14.
93. See supra notes 3-6.
94. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 39; see Solum, Virtues and Vices, supra note 33.
95. Robin West describes this form of merit, which is beyond mere knowledge, as sym-
pathetic judgment.
[T]he sympathetic judgment is not information; it is not simply a judgment about
the suffering of others. It presupposes, as well as facilitates, a commitment to
oppose the cause of the other's subjective suffering, as well as an understanding of
it. When we sympathize with the suffering of another, we understand what she's
going through, but we do not just understand it, we are also moved to lessen it.
transcendent-after all, she ran into the arms of a man whom she
barely knew and turned down employment opportunities9 6-her acts
of moving to a different town and marrying an American simultane-
ously reveal her capacity to resist the worst forms of subjugation
through pragmatic decisionmaking, and her powerful, empathetic
sense of moral responsibility for the welfare of her daughter. Further-
more, Maria kept her personal integrity in sight. For Maria, this
meant committing herself to her original plan of escaping her ex-hus-
band's threats and making a new life for herself, with or without a
man to support her.
Maria's story illustrates her fidelity, praxis, and empathy, and has
something to offer our estimation of what it is to be "meritorious" and
"deserving" in this society. We need a society of people who are able
to overcome obstacles in productive ways; we should seek out individ-
uals who exhibit firm moral commitments to others. Maria's merit,
however, is not simply a "good" in the private realm of my family.
Instead, it has the potential to extend into the public sphere, since her
personal experience with oppression and learned methods of moral
coping bodes well for her ability to empathize with the situations and
decisions of other oppressed people. It is also a model of productive
action combined with self-respect. However, as I will discuss in the
next two sections, a simple recognition of Outsider virtue is not suffi-
cient. Instead, mechanisms for deploying these lessons are also re-
quired to achieve an enlightened societal understanding of merit.
When we sympathize, we share in the pain and commit ourselves to resist its
source.
West, supra note 88, at 686-87.
96. Not only may my grandmother's formidable praxis be unrecognized by a
majoritarian conception of merit, it may also fail to be recognized by feminist theory.
Feminist theory at present, especially feminist legal theory, tends to focus on wo-
men as passive victims.... This story of woman as victim is meant to encourage
solidarity by emphasizing shared oppression.... [But] black women have had to
learn to construct themselves in a society that denied them full selves.... [and an
inclusive feminist theory should insist] on the importance of will and creativity.
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism, in Feminist Legal Theory, in FEMINIST LEGAL
THEORY 348-355 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993). See also Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness
and Women, In Practice and Theory: A Reply to Catharine MacKinnon, 5 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 217, 220 (1993) ("[D]efining gender by what is done to women, and centering
the definition of what is done to us around sexual exploitation-tend to ignore creativity
and struggle in women's experience[s] that have been particularly emphasized as important
to women of color.").
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B. The Role Model
Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis
for imposing a racially classified remedy. The role model the-
ory... typif[ies] this indefiniteness. There are numerous expla-
nations for a disparity between the percentage of minority
students and the percentage of minority faculty, many of them
completely unrelated to discrimination of any kind.
97
Reflecting upon my grandmother's story prompts me to wonder
what she would have accomplished if the kind of opportunities that I
have had through affirmative action had been available to her.9" The
virtues, or merit, of praxis and empathy which I find my grandmother
forged out of her oppressive circumstances do not end the discussion
over what merit should mean in the affirmative action context. My
grandmother had profound, hard-won merit. However, she did not
have the opportunity to utilize her skills in the public sphere. Thus my
grandmother's teaching occurred in the home where she instilled in
me a rigorous work ethic and sensitized me to the vagaries of
discrimination.
Outside of the private realm, no one gave Maria the tools to com-
municate her perceptions and experiences to others in public policy
debate; no one seemed that interested at all. Indeed, Maria had been
so consistently devalued that she did not even feel as though she had
the right "face" with which to communicate her ideas. For example,
even now when she recalls becoming a naturalized American citizen,
Maria reveals her perception that to "really become" an American,
she would have had to become something else.
"Did you feel any different [when you became an American citi-
zen]?" I asked her once. She looked down at her hands and half-
smiled.
"Well," she told me, "I felt very American. I felt blonde, I felt my
eyes blue. I felt better.... I am an American now."
The potential of affirmative action to increase the presence of
such Outsiders in higher level positions is important for merit-teach-
ing-that is, the reconfiguration of the definition of merit through the
inclusion of previously silenced voices-because it guards against this
lack of self-esteem by providing positive, successful models for Out-
siders, consequently strengthening the tenor of these excluded voices.
97. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986).
98. For I do believe that I am a product of affirmative action, or what Stephen Carter
calls an "Affirmative Action Baby." STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTION OF AN AFFIRMA-
TIVE AcTION BABY (1990).
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Moreover, affirmative action provides Outsiders with opportunities to
reach beyond the places where people listen and learn from them.
Evaluated in this light, the concept of the "role model" is a critical
merit-teaching tool, since role models occupy positions of high status.
Role modeling, however, is not in vogue right now. "Do you really
want to be a role model?" Richard Delgado asks, rhetorically identi-
fying the baggage and pitfalls assigned to minorities who take on such
a burden.9 Regina Austin also provides an incisive critique of role
modeling, identifying how it can restrict the lives of real women of
color in favor of idealistic "model" images.100
Nevertheless, I think that role modeling-a basis for affirmative
action which the Supreme Court rejects' 01-operates in the notion of
merit in two ways. First, role modeling facilitates the reconfiguration
of the definition of merit since placing Outsiders in higher status posi-
tions communicates the message that their voices, skills, and virtues
are valuable and meritorious in this society. 0 Outsider role model
mentors also possess certain skills that enable other Outsiders to find
their own voices, an empowering tool that goes beyond symbolism.
Consequently, this strengthens Outsiders' self-esteem and ability to
participate in public rhetoric, a necessary prerequisite to merit-teach-
ing. Second, role modeling itself reveals Outsider merit in action. It is
difficult, keen work to be a role model. It is empathy in action.
My own mother's story reflects some of these themes. My
mother, Thelma Diaz Quinn, came to California in 1955. She was
fourteen. My mother realized early on that she wanted to become an
educator and thus pursued a teaching credential at a nearby state col-
lege. She became a Spanish teacher in the Los Angeles School
District.
When I asked my mother about the presence of role models in
her own education, she responded that she did not have any profes-
99. See Delgado, supra note 19.
100. Austin, supra note 47, at 580 (Austin discusses the firing of Crystal Chambers, a
single woman who worked as an arts and crafts instructor for the Girl's Club-where "ap-
proximately 90 percent of the program participants were black"-and was fired when she
became pregnant, thus violating the "negative role model rule": "Role models are not an
adequate response to material conditions that limit the choices of young black women,
both those who get pregnant and those who do not. 'Pride,' and 'positive identities' are not
substitutes for 'prosperity' or 'power."').
101. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
102. See Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Ac-
tion Debate, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1327, 1329 (1986) ("[Affirmative action] expand[s] ... [the]
professional class able to pass.., elevated aspirations to subsequent generations ... [and]
teach[es] whites that blacks, too, are capable of handling responsibility ... ").
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sional role models, but did have a dearth of Latina colleagues (who
could also be viewed as a type of role model):
Well, I really didn't have, I can't think of role models in my
life-in education, that is. Grandma was a big force when I was
growing up. Although not academically, no. I always had to
feel very strong myself. I remember very clearly only fifteen
percent of the student population of the colleges and universi-
ties were women. I was one of those fifteen. And I was a Mexi-
can-American which made me even more unique.0 3
When my mother became an educator, however, she wholeheartedly
embraced the part of role model mentor for her Latino students. Her
students were often recent immigrants, did not speak much English,
and were profoundly intimidated by both their new classmates and
American society.
I asked my mother what she could give to those students that
non-Latino professors could not. She explained how she feels that her
mission is not simply to impart abstract knowledge, but also to help
develop the students' self-esteem and confidence. My mother be-
lieves that she is particularly well-suited for this task, because she not
only has a unique commitment to her Latino students' welfare, but
also shares some common life experiences with them and conse-
quently understands particular obstacles to success they may
encounter.
[My other colleagues,] they go there to teach history, to teach
math, whatever. But I believe in teaching the whole kid, every-
thing that he needs to know [to] become aware of the world. It
has nothing to do with Spanish. No one else seems to take an
interest. [For example,] when the opportunity was given to the
entire school to get the extra bilingual credential, I was the only
one who took that opportunity in my school.
No, I would not just teach Spanish or just teach English. I
would teach about life also. I would give lectures about self-
esteem, I would teach them about the importance of setting
goals in their life. [In] the Hispanic community, [much] of the
old thinking is still there. It's that only God knows what's going
to happen in the future. I would tell them, "no," you will know
what you will be doing with your life. Don't leave it up to God.
You have to set goals. And you must believe that you will reach
them, because the moment that you say "no, I don't have the
money, I'm not intelligent enough, I'm not this, I'm not that,"
103. Telephone Interview with Thelma Diaz Quinn (January 23, 1995). Quotations at-
tributed to "my mother" or "Thelma" throughout the remainder of this Essay refer to this
interview, but, at the request of the author, will not be cited in an attempt to preserve the
narrative flow of these sections.
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you just said "no." No matter what else is handed to you it will
not happen because you said to yourself "no."
In this version of role modeling, my mother, who herself had felt the
exclusion of being without role models-"I always had to feel very
strong myself"-clearly demonstrates "different" merit in action. My
mother expands the definition of what "merit" is by example, skill,
and commitment.
1. Example
First, the contributions of Outsiders at higher levels affirms the
value both of people of color and white women, and refutes the un-
derlying presumption that these groups cannot "get the job done."
Outsiders, such as my mother, who are willing to take the opportunity
to become role models, are capable of translating their moral commit-
ments and their different knowledge into productive, visible action.
While supporting and inspiring other Outsiders to succeed, they chal-
lenge a "race-less," "gender-less" vision of merit through their actions,
thus advancing the concept of merit-teaching. Some disagree with this
assessment of the effects of affirmative action,1°4 but in my own expe-
rience, seeing Outsiders in positions of authority has always affirmed
my sense of Outsiders' value. Witnessing role models has verified my
sense of our complex intersectional fidelity, empathy, tenacity, praxis,
and justice. It also affirms my conception of self-worth.
2. Skill
Second, my mother possesses skills that other teachers may not
possess. From her experiences my mother has developed an empathy
for Latino students which translates into a moral commitment to fos-
ter their welfare and equality which her non-Latino colleagues have
not demonstrated. In addition, her particular knowledge and skills for
coping with the burdens suffered by Latinos are a great advantage in
her profession. She understands, for example, the paralyzing intimi-
dation that Latinos can feel in this country, and their learned response
to rely on religion to assuage disappointments. In response, my
mother teaches productive action in the face of adversity; "never say
'no,"' "set goals," and "believe in yourself" are her themes.
Role models' particular knowledge of oppression enables them to
communicate the nature of that oppression to other Outsiders (as well
as to the majority), and to articulate methods for challenging it. Thus
104. See Carter, supra note 98. Stephen L. Carter, for example, believes that affirma-
tive action stigmatizes people of color.
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"role modeling" can be broadly construed. It can come either in the
form of a teacher who, knowing the obstacles her students of color
face, gives them tools to overcome those obstacles; or a doctor who
focuses on the particular needs of his community;10 5 or an architect
who tries to "leave [his] city better than [he] found it."'1 6 All of these
individuals incorporate into the definition of merit "raced" and
"gendered" attributes because their formidable contributions have
"cultural meaning." That is, role models' accomplishments are lo-
cated around the axis of their "different" identities; their accomplish-
ments are directed and shaped by their goals of aiding, being a voice
for, and inspiring other Outsiders.
3. Commitment
Finally, a role model potentially embodies the greatest, most val-
uable form of merit of all. When I asked my mother why she works so
hard at being a role model (beyond teaching her students "life les-
sons," she also drives high school graduates to the city college to regis-
ter for classes, and gives free English lessons out of her home) she
answered: "Because I love them. I don't know why, I just do. They
drive me crazy sometimes, but you know, I still love them. And I
think, at least I hope so, that they can sense that."' 7
C. Diversity
Just as a "diverse student body" contributing to a "robust ex-
change of ideas" is a "constitutionally permissible goal" on
105. See Nicholas Lamann, Taking Affirmative Action Apart, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1995,
at 36 (Lamann portrays Patrick Chavis, a 43-year-old obstetrician-gynecologist who was
admitted into the U.C. Davis Medical school under the special-admit program. Chavis
says:
[H]e worke[d] harder than [his white medical-school classmate[s] [did] and in
tougher conditions. He and his four black classmates set up a primary-care clinic
when they were at Davis and worked there as volunteers, but they couldn't get
any of the white students to join them.... He ticks off what the black doctors
admitted under Davis's special minorities-only program... are doing now: almost
all are in primary care in underserved areas.
Id
106. See Tinah Saunders, Architect's Tribute Has Been Building For Years, THE AT-
LANTA J. AND CONST., May 4, 1995, at D4 (profiling architect Joseph W. Robinson who
benefitted from an early affirmative action contract-program, designed homes for African-
Americans whose homes were being destroyed by an advancing expressway system, won
awards for his designs, and mentored high school students).
107. Needless to say, this form of fidelity requires time, dedication, and hard, hard
work. See Delgado, supra note 19, at 1226-27 ("Being a role model is a tough job, with
long hours and much heavy lifting. You are expected to uplift your entire people. Talk
about hard, sweaty work!") (citations omitted).
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which a race-conscious university admissions program may be
predicated, the diversity of views and information on the air-
waves serves important First Amendment values. The benefits
of such diversity are not limited to the members of minority
groups who gain access to the broadcasting industry by virtue of
the ownership policies; rather, the benefits redound to all mem-
bers of the viewing and listening audience .... "[T]he American
public will benefit by having access to a wider diversity of infor-
mation sources."'
108
Diversity, which has not yet been eliminated by the Supreme Court as
a valid, constitutional justification for affirmative action,10 9 presents
another opportunity for merit-teaching. In addition, "being" diverse
can be a meritorious act in and of itself.
In Bakke, the Supreme Court posited that diversifying a medical
school's student body through the admission of students with "particu-
lar background[s]-whether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally ad-
vantaged or disadvantaged"-would benefit the medical profession
since the introduction of these students' "outlooks[ ] and ideas" would
"enrich... training" and "better equip ... graduates to render with
understanding their vital service to humanity." 1 0 Further, in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C.,"' the Supreme Court somewhat
opaquely referred to the advantage (in broadcasting) of increasing the
robust exchange of ideas through diversity.
Racial and gender diversity is critical in education and in the
workplace beyond promoting the realization that people of color and
white women can "do the job." Diverse workplaces and educational
facilities are also crucial as means to increase the majority's exposure
to the "idea" of the type of Outsider merit that is well illustrated by
my grandmother's and my mother's stories-the empathies, skills, and
fidelities that they have formed directly as a consequence of their Out-
sider status. Diversity provides an otherwise unrealized opportunity
for validating Outsider perspectives and approaches to problem-solv-
ing through rhetorical exchange among "different" colleagues. I hope
this opportunity will ultimately lead to an enriched expansion of the
definition of merit. 12
108. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 568 (1990) (citations omitted).
109. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097,2127 (1995) ("The proposi-
tion that fostering diversity may provide a sufficient interest to justify such a program is not
inconsistent with the Court's holding [requiring that all benign racial classifications be ana-
lyzed under strict scrutiny].").
110. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978).
111. 497 U.S. at 547.
112. For a related view, compare Rogovin's conclusion regarding the incorporation of
minority perspectives:
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My own experiences as a law student might help to illuminate this
point. I am an American-born, mixed ethnicity Latina. I grew up in
the suburbs of Long Beach and was educated in public schools until I
attended Stanford Law School. Upon arriving at Stanford, I exper-
ienced something of a revelation. I had spent the last four years at
UCLA studying literature and working as a tutor in a program that
serviced minority students. Stanford, to me, was full of rich people
with fancy backgrounds. Some of my classmates were, after all, the
sons and daughters of investment bankers, lawyers, doctors, and cap-
tains of industry. And one of the main distinctions I perceived be-
tween "them" and me was that they had grown up having dinner table
conversations about public policy, legal doctrine, and international re-
lations, while I had grown up in a single-mother household, discussing
feelings and personal histories. Nevertheless, I snapped to my legal
education task quickly enough and overcompensated by studying at
all hours. After the initial hysteria wore off and my pangs of self-
doubt began to subside, I started to suspect that my analytical posi-
tions were sometimes different than some of my (more privileged)
classmates-in particular, those of my male classmates and male
professors. Yet my perspectives did not necessarily seem weaker. In-
deed, sometimes I perceived important aspects of the doctrine we
were studying that others did not.
It was the second semester of my first year of law school, and I
was taking a constitutional law class with a well-renowned scholar.
We were studying Craig v. Boren,"3 the case where the Supreme
Court announced the intermediate scrutiny standard of review for
gender classifications. Craig addressed an Oklahoma statute which
prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21, and to
females under the age of 18. The majority, in an opinion by Justice
Brennan, held that the classification was a denial of equal protection
to males from 18-20 years of age because the statistical evidence of-
fered by the State had not provided sufficiently strong evidence of
[E]xposing the majority culture to... diverse minority viewpoints will alter the
majority's focus and decrease both its inclination to automatically reject, or the
likelihood of its misunderstanding, new and seemingly strange ideas. Instead, mi-
nority perspectives will be incorporated into the very values and judgments that
inform the majority culture's taste.
Wendy M. Rogovin, The Regulation of Television in the Public Interest: On Creating a Par-
allel Universe in Which Minorities Speak and Are Heard, 42 CAT. U. L. REv. 51, 68
(1992).
113. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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young men's greater propensity to drink and drive;" 4 because there
was no particular evidence of the dangerousness of 3.2% beer as op-
posed to alcohol generally; and because the statute did not prohibit
young men's consumption of the beer, only its purchase." 5 Our class
focused on Justice Rehnquist's dissent, where he wrote that the statute
should be upheld because "there is no suggestion... that males in this
age group are in any way peculiarly disadvantaged, subject to system-
atic discriminatory treatment, or otherwise in need of special solici-
tude from the courts," and furthermore because "there [is] no
plausible argument that [this statute constitutes] discrimination
against females."" 6
This passage caused me to reflect on my college and high school
days, when I had encountered negative experiences with young men
and alcohol, and had plenty of exposure to the image of the hard-
drinking "'reckless' young m[an]" 17 that was woven into both the ma-
jority and dissenting opinions. I sensed that there was something
more in the Craig opinion than simply a lack of sufficient "fit" be-
tween a governmental goal of reducing drunk driving incidents and
the statistical frequency of young men's propensity to drink and drive.
While my professor continued lecturing, I rifled through my past ex-
periences with these matters. I uncomfortably recalled being sexually
assaulted in college by a large, drunk sophomore, and being unfavora-
bly contrasted to supposedly manly, hard-drinking, machos in social
and professional settings.
As I emerged from my memories, my professor was saying some-
thing to the effect of: "And so, Rehnquist's position did not win the
day because even though the statute did not discriminate against wo-
men, it did not survive this new, higher standard of review the Court
had just announced for gender classifications."
I raised my hand. "Maybe," I started. Weakly. "Maybe the law
was bad for women, though." My professor stared at me blankly, and
I felt the room cool down a notch.
114. Id. at 201-02 ("[T]he statistics broadly establish that .18% of females and 2% of
males in that age group were arrested for [drunk driving]. While such a disparity is not
trivial in a statistical sense, it can hardly form the basis for employment of a gender line as
a classifying device. Certainly if maleness is to serve as a proxy for drinking and driving, a
correlation of 2% must be considered an unduly tenuous 'fit."').
115. Id at 203-04.
116. Id at 219-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 203, n.14.
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I continued. "Maybe the law is bad because it furthers the image
of men being these reckless, drinking types. Maybe that's not good for
women."
"You think that a law that lets women drink before men discrimi-
nates against women?" my professor asked me, incredulously. Per-
haps it was something about the tone of his voice, or the apparent
strangeness of my position, but many of my classmates began laugh-
ing. My professor gave me a conciliatory wink and continued on with
his lecture.
This was not an affirming experience. First, I was quite invested
in winning the respect of my classmates, and the laughter indicated a
lack thereof. Second, I felt like my opinions had not been accorded
sufficient weight. Yet, after class several students approached me.
"That wasn't all wrong," one man told me. "I hadn't seen that
before, you know." Women talked to me about it too. Beyond spur-
ring an inelegant griping session about institutionalized hegemony
("forget this, I should've gone to film school"), my comment had
struck a nerve for them, and they agreed that women's particular ex-
periences with drunk men should be considered in the construction of
laws which regulate men.
This narrative is not intended to highlight my ultra-sensitive per-
spicacity of constitutional analysis, as there were many experiences
where other classmates provided even more incisive commentary
based on their own perspectives. Rather, it is designed to illustrate
one instance of how Outsiders' presence in the higher echelons of ed-
ucation and employment can slowly, but I think surely, expand the
definition of merit. For example, in the legal profession, the ability to
think abstractly, argue by analogy, and speak organizationally are
highly valued skills. However, Outsiders' experiences and different
resulting approaches can potentially help them track new roads to
"justice." That is, their experiences may give them insight to previ-
ously ignored injuries and problematic assumptions-such as the in-
jury that might occur when assumptions about male recklessness are
reiterated in statutes, or the ways in which certain analytical ap-
proaches "immunize[ ] the law from serious criticism.""18
118. See, e.g. Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in
Legal Education, 11 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1, 4 (1993) (noting the ability of Outsiders to "ex-
plode... abstraction[s] by stepping outside... doctrinal bounds ... [and reveal how legal
frameworks] perpetuate[ ] the devaluation of African-American perspectives" as well as
the attendant costs to exercising that ability).
Moving back to Aristotelian moral theory, this assessment of
Outsiders' potential contributions to legal reasoning focuses on their
phronesis-their practical wisdom-and the perception which grows
out of that experience: "[Flor because experience has given them an
eye they see aright." 119 Outsiders may have a different and valuable
form of this phronesis and concomitant perception, since the "practi-
cal experience" which informs their "eye" is subordination. 120 Exper-
iencing and overcoming subordination may clear the air for some
Outsiders, allowing them to discern what is morally relevant about a
set of facts, a statute, or a ruling, which remains unseen by the major-
ity. "Relevance" here refers to the oppression that may exist in some
set of facts, or to potential of a legal instrument to contribute to or
dismantle existing oppressive structures. This "relevance" can be
grounded in my own narrative, for example, as my experiences with
sexual subordination permitted me to tease out the strands of gender
hierarchy from a statute which my constitutional law professor be-
lieved to be uncontroversially in favor of women.'
2'
119. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk VI, ch. 11, p. 1143, col. b, 1. 14, re-
printed in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 31, at 1033; NUSSBAUM, supra
note 39, at 74 ("Practical insight is like perceiving in the sense that it is noninferential,
nondeductive; it is an ability to recognize the salient features of a complex situation.");
Solum, Virtues and Voices, supra note 37, at 136 (discussing the phronimos who "is able to
discern what is morally relevant about the situation").
120. See Lawrence Blum, Moral Perception and Particularity, 101 ETHICS 701, 715
(1991) ("[T]he perception of particularities is often a sensitivity to particular sorts of moral
features-injustice, racism, physical pain, discomfort-and general things can be said
about what promotes those sensitivities, about the obstacles to such sensitivities, and about
how such sensitivities develop.").
121. At this juncture, it is appropriate to point out how the narrative account of particu-
lar Outsider virtue, interestingly, appears in keeping with the theoretical framework of
Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry who wrote a detailed critique of the uses of narrative in
critical race and feminist theory. See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories
Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narrative, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993). These scholars
do see some benefits in narrative, particularly its ability to provide a "source of empathetic
understanding about members of outsider groups." IL at 830. However, they also posit
that legal scholars' narrative may, among other flaws, not be tied to legal analysis, and may
not contribute to knowledge. Id. at 847, 849. Nevertheless, the preceding narratives and
the concurrent analysis may satisfy some of their objections. For example, the use of narra-
tive to uncover some "raced" and "gendered" forms of phronesis fits into Farber's empha-
sis on practical reason as an alternative form of legal analysis. See id. at 820; see also
Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1331, 1341
(1988) ("The heart of pragmatist thought is the view that the ultimate test is always experi-
ence.") (citations omitted). It may be said that the narrative unearthing of "raced" or
"gendered" phronesis is tied to legal analysis. That is, it is instructive as to the definition of
"merit" which exists at the heart of the constitutional affirmative action issue. Further, the
narratives are also tied to Sherry's focus on the notions of Aristotelian virtue. See Suzanna
Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. Rav.
543, 609-610 (1986) (examining Justice O'Connor's punishment jurisprudence, which is in-
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Outsiders' experiences and accompanying perceptions can also
communicate their ability to contribute to professions which often call
for intangible qualities, such as "'unique experience, skills in commu-
nications, negotiation,"1 22 or "'interpersonal skills.""'12  However,
Outsiders' "intangible" qualities, such as their ability to solve
problems or manage subordinates, in special, valuable ways are often
shaped by personal characteristics of race, gender, ethnicity, and sex-
ual orientation. Accordingly, diversity-the introduction of signifi-
cant numbers of white women and people of color into education and
the workforce-is important for merit-teaching since the "symbolic"
presence of Outsiders in the higher echelons cannot alone expand the
meaning of merit. For this reason, our conception of affirmative ac-
tion cannot be limited to furthering role-modeling. Furthermore,
Outsider role models' presence in the higher echelons can be risky as
their different approach to a problem, if observed only in isolation,
can appear eccentric, or even unworthy.' 24 Although, with enough ex-
posure, the majority may ultimately come to value these different ap-
proaches-as did the man who found my insight on Craig v. Boren
illuminating.
Finally, "being" diverse itself sometimes requires its own form of
fidelity. There is a cost to pushing the envelope."2 Much in the way
that the role model strives, or the sufferer of past discrimination toils
to better her own life, so does the "diverse" employee or student.
Forging new paths requires tenacity, dedication, and vigilance. Thus,
formed by the "virtue of mercy or compassion" and focuses on "the responsibility and
virtue of the decisionmaker .... "). Scrutinizing merit through Aristotle's lens of virtues
illustrates how these narratives may contribute to "knowledge" by challenging founda-
tional assumptions of the moral theory and expanding our notion of "merit" in the affirma-
tive action debate.
122. Cherry v. AT&T, 47 F.3d 225, 230 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a gender discrimi-
nation suit, where plaintiff was attempting to prove her eligibility to a salary increase under
a salary plan, failed since she did not qualify as a "lobbyist").
123. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 234-35 (1989) (holding that an em-
ployer shown to have considered gender in making an employment decision must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that the decision would have been the same without gen-
der considerations).
124. See, e.g. id. (where a female plaintiff's aggressive methods of communicating-
which could be seen as a productive attribute formed by gender relations-were held
against her, even though she had successfully utilized her aggressiveness in negotiation
situations).
125. See Crenshaw, supra note 118, at 4 (Crenshaw details the costs of an African-
American student's choice to "explode... abstraction[s]... [in the law school classroom]:
she would risk being regarded as an emotional-perhaps even an hysterical-Black person
railing against the law in an obviously biased, unlawyerlike manner.").
diversity is not a passive status nor is inclusion a free handout. It can
be (at best?) active, hard work.
IV. Conclusion
Merit is usually considered a stumbling block for advocates of
affirmative action. The primary complaint is that white women and
people of color ubiquitously maneuver around our neutrally-formed
"meritocracy" in order to grab a bag full of goodies. However, our
modem conception of merit is not a monolithic, hard-edged, one-di-
mensional "Truth" which was formed in apolitical abstraction.
Rather, it has excluded certain manifestations of merit from the
calculus. There may be varied conceptions of the meaning of merit,
such as the qualities of perceptiveness and tenacity which are hard-
won by experiencing and overcoming oppression. Accordingly, this
Essay does not seek to discredit "merit-ideals," but rather, it aims to
include Outsiders within its parameters.
The current debate over the meaning of merit in affirmative ac-
tion can be viewed through the lens of Aristotelian moral theory. Ar-
istotle's identification of the virtues of temperance, justice, and
courage seem at least somewhat related to modem articulations of
what merit means, namely fidelity and dedication. Similarly, Aris-
totle's biased conceptions of the meaning of merit'26 mirror the exclu-
sive and myopic terms in which we configure merit today. Merit, as
apparently expressed by the antiaffirmative action thinkers, is some-
thing you earn. It exists, on a chart, with correlating numbers; it can
be gauged to ascertain who is the best.
Yet what merit means in the workplace or in education is not so
easily quantified, even by the majority's own delineation. For exam-
ple, in Bakke, it was unclear how subjective criteria contributed to a
candidate's "benchmark score," which was the summation of an inter-
view, grades, MCAT, letters of recommendation, and other biographi-
cal data. 127 Furthermore, many fields look for some form of
intangible excellence in their applicants. 128 Nevertheless, some forms
of merit-the lessons learned from the wages of oppression, and the
modes of praxis used to combat it-may not have been recognized by
126. See supra notes 25, 31.
127. See Philip Fetzer, 'Reverse Discrimination'. The Political Use of Language, 12
NAT'L BLACK L.J 212,223 (1993) ("The Bakke opinion does not reveal what percentage of
the benchmark score was derived from personal interviews, extra-curricular activities, or
'overcoming disadvantage' as opposed to the clearly quantitative factors.").
128. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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the majority in its definition of that "excellence," simply because we
have developed our sense of the "good" in the workplace and schools
in exclusion of diverse points of view.
Further, the color-blind approach advocated by the Initiative
seeks to truly blind us to those different types of virtue; the mother
whose tenacity and sympathy is the consequence of subjugation by her
ex-husband, the teacher whose empathy and skill has been shaped by
her experiences as a recent immigrant, and the lawyer whose enriched
understanding of a statute stems from her personal, "gendered" con-
frontations. The "gendered" and "raced" nature of the formation of
these types of merit would be perilously ignored by the color-blind
approach insisted on by the Initiative-an approach which seeks to
divorce the "good" from race, gender and ethnicity. This ignorance
seems particularly piercing as the state continually reiterates its goal
of equality in the same breath in which it rejects the tenets of affirma-
tive action.'29 The failure to continue placing white women and peo-
ple of color in the higher echelons of work and education, as role
models and diversity models, will only hasten the retreat from the
merit-teaching that affirmative action is now making possible.
This returns us to the law school admissions hypothetical posed
earlier.130 Viewing Candidate B's skills in terms of gender and race,
her ethnic background, and professional and charitable activities seem
valuable as they evidence empathy and praxis which is particularly
geared toward the elimination of Outsiders' subjugation-laudable at-
tributes for a lawyer. Although Candidate A also evidences charitable
impulses, and a greater facility for test-taking, his selection should not
necessarily be a foregone conclusion in a society where Outsiders are
so desperately in need of advocates with special skill in addressing
their concerns. Thus, my preference for Candidate B is not simply a
knee-jerk, hands-out reaction. Instead, it is a recognition of Candi-
date B's actual virtue; a virtue or merit which is contextualized,
"racialized," and "gendered," and which would be missed under a
color-blind approach.
One final caveat must be added. Obviously, there are dangers in
celebrating Outsider merit, especially when that celebration specifi-
cally configures merit in terms of oppression. Taken to a logical ex-
129. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) ("To whatever ra-
cial group these citizens belong, their 'personal rights' to be treated with equal dignity and
respect are implicated by a rigid rule erecting race as the sole criterion in an aspect of
public decisionmaking.").
130. Supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
treme, the approach may suggest that Outsiders are only best
qualified to fulfill social welfare positions (although the "social wel-
fare" category could be quite expansive). However, I do not think
that Outsiders only possess virtue forged from the wages of oppres-
sion, as to say so would denigrate the skills they exhibit which are not
necessarily learned through subordination. For example, it took in-
tense hard work to learn the analytical lessons of law school-an edu-
cation for which I had not been primed at the dinner table, in contrast
to some of my more privileged classmates. Furthermore, this Essay
does not suggest that the experience or legacy of subordination is so
fabulous that Outsiders are made "better" by their lower status. This
suggestion would seem inconsistent with the position that Outsiders
need to be included, and their status needs to be raised.
Instead, I am searching for a more expansive meaning of merit. I
find that merit exists in forms that are not presently accounted for,
and would possibly never be brought to light under a color-blind or
gender-blind approach. Through the stories of my grandmother, my
mother, and even myself, some of merit's different ("gendered" and
"raced") forms can be unearthed-the recognition of which may some
day forge the road toward a greater wealth of merit-teaching.
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